Elements of Apocalyptic Thinking

The roots of apocalyptic thinking are so fundamental to the way we see the world that it is difficult to see this as anything other just the way the world is. However, it is not the way the world is. It is the way we see the world. Before attempting to justify that claim, let me lay out the elements of apocalyptic thinking.

First, there is a belief that their is a 'right' way that things should be and they have gotten off track from that. Second, if we don't do something to set things right, forces beyond out control will set them right for us. Further, there is an element of retribution in the forces beyond our control setting things right. That is, there is some element of punishment for not have kept things on track for ourselves.

Let's say that an unfortunate investor put money in a lot of risky "get rich quick" schemes and landing up loosing everything as well as incurring a lot of debt in the process. Consider the following two statements.

1) He got what he deserved for trying to get rich quick.

2) The probability of loosing everything increases as the riskiness of investments increases. However, there is also a chance you could win big. There are also possibilities for small losses or small gains.

The first of the two statements is more of a moral assessment than an objective assessment. People should work hard and invest prudently. If they do not, bad things will happen. The second allows for the fact that when people gamble, some people actually do win. So retribution is not built into the fabric of reality.

We would like to believe that retribution is built into the fabric of reality. Consequently, we tend to notice instances where the apparent retribution takes place, while ignoring cases where it does not. Thus, our selective data gathering tends to support what we would like to believe is the case.

There are several problems with the elements of apocalypticism. First, the 'right' way is something we impose on the world based on our human values. Doing all the 'right' things makes the human race prosper and grow. This probably not the 'right' thing for the other inhabitants of the planet. Second, the forces of nature are, well, the forces of nature. They do not bring things back into line with human values. They just do what they do. Third, although we do see elements of equilibrium in nature, equilibrium is not retribution.

We apply this apocalyptic notion of retribution to issues of all sizes from individual to social to global. And the magnitude of the retribution ranges from small hand slaps to total destruction of human life. In the next post we will take up the range of applications of this notion.

Truth and Method

Francis Bacon said that method is more important than genius in discovering knowledge. He compared our pursuit of truth to a runner in pursuit of a destination. Method is the path and genius is the speed of the runner. A runner on the wrong path will get to the wrong place. If he happens to be a fast runner, he will get to the wrong place sooner. A runner on the right path will get to the right place. If he happens to be a slow runner, he will still get there. It will just take a little longer. So, method, according to Bacon will get us to the truth eventually. Genius will just get us to the wrong places faster.

Despite the variety of truth that we discussed a couple posts ago, they all have a similar method by which we arrived at them. Truth begins with a claim of some kind that we then attempt to determine the veracity of. Then we continue to test the veracity. Over time, if the claim continues to hold up as more and more people test the veracity, then we begin to accept the claim as true. This sketch of our method for discovering truth needs a little more fleshing out, but the essence holds up across different domains.

First, the claim cannot just be any willy nilly claim. It has to be a valid claim based on our understanding of the domain and clearly derivable from the things we know.

Second, the attempts to determine the veracity should be skeptical but not cynical. Skeptical means that we are trying to determine the truth rather than re-enforce what we want to believe. Not being cynical means that we have to accept evidence that is not 100% certain.

And, third, the motives of those who do repeated testing on the idea should be to determine the veracity of the idea and not some other agenda such as discrediting it. And, if the claim continues to hold up over time and under repeated challenges, then we accept its durability and accept it as the truth.

The next step is to show how this sketch of method holds up in the variety of areas we already discussed, revealing that scientific truth, literary truth, historical truth, and even moral truths have something in common. And we will see how this apporach applies to the use of stories in the pursuit of moral truth. Finally, just to push things to their limit, I will introduce a notion of truth about the future which I will call imaginary truth. Imaginary truth can and will be held to the same standards of durability as our other notions of truth. And, imaginary truth gives us a headlight into the future that we badly need as the future continues to come at us at an increasingly faster rate.

What is the Truth, Anyway?

You would think that there is an answer to the question - what is the truth? Unfortunately, this is not the case. Like witnesses reporting the 'facts' of a traffic accident, different observers have very different perspectives.

There is a correspondence theory of truth that says a thing is true if it corresponds to the real world. This sounds pretty good but begins to fall apart when we ask what we mean by "corresponds to the real world". Since we organize our knowledge into categories and structures that certainly don't exist in the real world, this gets a little dicey.

Another view, called the coherence view, suggests that those categories and structures must provide a consistent and coherent view of the world and use coherency as the criterion for truth. That is, it needs to make sense considering other things we know.

While both of these provide useful ways of looking at the truth, they both address truth about the natural world. If we are seeking truth about the social world such as, how do we interpret and explain the human experience, or if we are looking for truths about the moral sphere such as, how should we behave as moral agents, then there is no place to look in the natural world for answers. Hints maybe, but answers - no.

This is to say that despite our reverence for science and despite the great reputation it has for bringing us closer to the truth about the natural world, science does not bring us one iota closer to truth about the social world or the moral sphere. What does bring us closer to truth about interpreting our experience as humans and how we should behave as moral agents? The answer, which I will get around to eventually, is - stories.

The Role of Stories in the Ethics of Virtual Worlds

In a previous post, I cited Marshall McLuhan's famous, and yet apocryphal quote "looking to the past to understand the future is like driving by looking in the rear view mirror." A rapidly changing technological base creates a path into the future with a lot of twists and turns, in which the future comes at us with increasing rapidity. The question is - how do we get a headlight into the future that will allow us to look forward instead of backwards in order to make decisions about what we need to do. The answer, I believe, is stories. Stories provide a headlight into the future, a way to explore possible worlds and possible outcomes.

My favorite example of this kind of story is Micheal Crichton's Jurassic Park. This cautionary tale is an attempt to explore the ethics of bio technology in a narrative form. Crichton's argument is that if you have unregulated bio tech research and have scientists working primarily for profit or fame, then all hell will break loose and nature will strike back at you. This book is a masterpiece of writing technique and makes a compelling narrative argument. But, it is only one possible narrative argument.

I teach a class in writing stories to explore the ethcis of technology, and, in this class, I have students find a flaw in Crichton's argument and provide a narrative alternative. Consider, for a moment, some of the stories that have swayed public thinking in a major way. These include: The Jungle, Uncle Tom's Cabin, Hard Times and Frankenstein; just to name a few. Each of these stories has presented one single narrative argument, one possible world. What we really need is to have authors take on more sides of the argument and allow us to see a variety of possible worlds.

In the same way that scientific debates lead to a better understanding of what is true, narrative debates can allow us to acheive a better understanding of what is good or what is desirable. And, here we are back to writing again. In Plato's Republic, he dismissed the poets to focus on rationality. Perhaps, now, in the 21st century, we will realise that rationality isn't everything and invite the poets back in.

Virtual Worlds and Possible Consequentialism

Since more the more traditional character and experience based ethical theories have limited application for virtual worlds, what basis do we have for defining appropriate behavior? One answer is that we can just wait and see what happens. Over time we will develop experience and over time a community will coalesce that can define appropriate behavior. But there are three problems with this approach. First, during that time when we are developing experience, things will be happening in virtual worlds that may not be to our liking. Second, once standards of virtual world behavior evolve and coalesce they may be very difficult to change. So, we may realize how things ought to be, but be unable to make them that way. Third, since the technology continues to evolve, the requisite experience continues to shift. We may not be able to acquire the requisite experiences until the technology stabilizes and that may be a lot longer than we are willing to wait. Having said all that, there is merit in waiting. In the early days of the web, some people would like to have restricted free speech and impose severe penalties for copyright infringement. That debate is still going on and we shouldn't be enforcing standards until we figure out what those standards ought to be. I don't think waiting is a bad idea. I just don't think it is the best idea. What do I think is the best idea?

Several years ago, I wrote a series of papers in computer ethics in which I introduced an ethical theory which I called possible consequentialism. Unlike the more traditional consequentialist theories that set ethical standards based upon the consequences of an act or rule, possible consequentialism considers possible consequences. This seems to be an appropriate basis for making ethical decisions under the conditions of a rapidly evolving technology where the consequences of any given standard may not be known at the time when the standard needs to be developed. That's all well and good, but how do we know the possible consequences? That is what we will turn to next.

Will Experience Based Ethics Work in a Virtual World?

I don't think there really is such a thing as experience based ethics. What I have done here is to lump together ethical theories that use past behavior and outcomes to determine appropriate ethical behaviors for the future. The most obvious example of this is consequentialist ethics where the ethical quality of an act is determined by the consequences of that act. However, I would also lump deontological ethics into this group as well. Deontological ethics suggest that we have a basic duty as human beings to behave in certain ways. For example, you should always use of people as an end but not a means. This is certainly an important tenat for preserving human dignity. However, I would say, perhpas with a dash of cynicism that this duty is derived from the fact that it has worked well in the past and thus should work well in the future. So, as I said, I lump it together with experience based ethics. And, I do not beleive that experience based ethics can serve as a moral basis for virtual worlds. Why not?

Marshall McLuhan is attributed with the quote that "looking to the past to understand the future is like driving by looking in the rear view mirror". There seems to be contention over whether he said it or not and I'm not even sure if I got the quote exactly right. But the sentiment is clear. We cannot look to the past to understand the future. And if that is the case then experience based ethics are of limited value. So, let us consider the cases when the past is a good guide and when it is not a good guide.

Using the driving analogy, one can see that as long as you don't drive too fast and the road ahead is as straight as the road behind, then one might get away with driving while looking in the rear view mirror. However, if the car picks up speed or if the road is windy then driving by looking in the rear view mirror will not work. Applying this to the future, when the future is coming at us rapidly and when the future is much different from the past, then looking to the past to understand the future will not work. This is the case, I would argue, with virtual worlds. The technological change is coming at us fast and the future will be very different from the past. So looking to the past, which is what experience based ethics does, will not work. Hence, expereince based ethics will not work in a virtual world. Having ruled out both experience based ethics and character based ethics, is there any thing that will work in a virtual world. I think there is. And you will have to stay tuned for the answer.

Will Virtue Ethics Work in a Virtual World?

Virtue ethics is a character based ethical theory that claims, simply, that morally developed people cannot do immoral things. At first this sounds a little odd because it seems to give license to immoral behavior. But, if you think of it as good people trying their best to do the right thing it makes a little more sense. After all, what other standard do we have for developing morals. I am a big fan of virtue ethics because it requires moral development rather than rule following; and it helps us figure out what to do in cases where the rules aren't clear or don't exist. We just have good people trying their best to figure out the right thing. In the ethics of technology this is particularly appropriate since technology seems to create new problems for which we don't have rules. In fact, many years ago I presented a paper at a conference suggesting virtue ethics as a basis for computer ethics. Having said that, I am not sure that virtue ethics would be an appropriate basis for ethical decision making in a virtual world. Why is that?

Virtue ethics was developed in Ancient Greece where people were born into a community and indoctrinated into the values of the community. Moral development was achieved by the citizens of the community with respect to those values. When the educational process was successful (I am certain it was not always) then citizens internalized community values. If community values changed or if new situations arose they would be discussed and debated by citizens in an attempt to develop or adjust values as needed. The key elements for this to work is that you need to have a fairly homogeneous community with a relatively stable set of values and an educational process by which new members are developed morally consistent with that set of stable values. None of these elements hold for virtual worlds.

Virtual worlds are a global phenomenon. Residents from all of the world, from a wide variety of moral and religious perspectives and traditions interact. Trying to abstract a homogeneous set of values for the residents of virtual worlds would be like trying to establish a global code of ethics.
Even if it were possible to do this, you would still have the problem of moral development. When people come to the virtual world they already have their values in place. You do not get them young enough in a virtual world nor do you have enough control over them to attempt to develop them morally consistent with those values. Finally, since virtual worlds are a new phenomenon, the ethics of virtual worlds are still evolving. We don't really know what constitutes good behavior in virtual worlds. So, we do not have a stable set of values to use for moral development.

The point here is that while virtue ethics has a lot to be said for it, and although it may have worked well in Ancient Greece, it is probably not the best moral basis for virtual worlds. Perhaps some day. But not now.

The Moral Basis for Ethical Decision Making in a Virtual World

So far, in our exploration of the ethics of virtual worlds, we have addressed avatar attachment, anonymity, and regulation. I don't mean to imply that this covers the full set of issues. I only mean to say that these are the largest issues that occur to me at the moment. The final one of these issues that I promised to address back when I started this threat was the moral basis of ethical decision making in a virtual world. That is to say, which theories of moral behavior provide the best guidance for ethical decisions?

At the risk of having professional ethicists gnashing their their teeth, I am going to dismiss descriptive theories such as ethical relativism and egoism. They claim to tell us how things are and are of limited value in determining how things should be. I am going to focus on prescriptive theories that tell us how things should be. I do this because virtual world technology is currently evolving and we can have great influence on how they evolve. Consequently, we should focus on how things should be.

Again, at the risk of offending the pros, I am going to group prescriptive ethical theories into two groups: character based and experience based. This is not too far from standard treatments and provides an economical scheme for the argument I wish to make here. Over the next few posts, I will argue that both character based moral theories and experience based moral theories have limitations that may inhibit their usefulness in providing a moral basis for ethical decision making in a virtual world. Then, I will wrap up this thread with a moral perspective that, I believe, overcomes these limitations. It will take, as Colridge said "a willing suspension of disbelief" as we journey into the morality of virtual worlds. But, come along with an open mind and I will try to make it worth your while.